In a supply chain, when the supply is hit by an unexpected disruption, the supplier may face certain financial difficulty to resume normal production, causing a supply shortage as well as a loss to the manufacturer and the entire supply chain. Combining a penalty term in writing contracts with the provision of financial assistance is the -carrot and stick‖ approach used by a manufacturer to deal with supply disruption. This article investigates how the manufacturer, in a better financial situation, may use ex-ante penalty terms and ex-post financial assistance to compel the supplier to recover its production capability as much as possible. We find that, the MS (integration of financial assistance and the non-delivery penalty) is the best strategy for the manufacturer in most situations, but it is not a win-win strategy. An interesting result contrary to the conventional wisdom, is that the optimal delivery quantity for the supply chain under the centralized decision-making is less than that under the decentralized decision-making.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief literature review. The model is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a benchmark case where the supplier and the manufacturer use a quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain. Sections 5 and 6 investigate the PS, MS and FAS, respectively. Sections 7 and 8 analyze the strategy preference of the manufacturer as well as parameter sensitivity, respectively. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Supply chain disruption has attracted interest from both researchers and practitioners of operations management. Disruption, usually infrequent and temporary, causes a significant change to the system when it occurs. Hendricks and Singhal [5] provide a diverse set of supply disruption examples, proving that ignoring the possibility of supply chain disruptions can have devastating economic consequences.
Yu and Qi [11] present a thorough coverage of how disruption management concept is applied and what impact it makes.
Our study is particularly related to studies that focus on supply disruption (for reviews, see Tang [7] and Snyder et al. [12] ). Based on a summary of relevant supply chain risk categories done by Heckmann et al. [13] , supply disruption is regarded as a type of network risk. As we have mentioned earlier, in practice, various operational tools can be used to leverage supply disruptions, such as multi-sourcing, carrying inventory, alternative supply sources and backup production options, mutual assistance and contract design and coordination.
A large body of literature studies multi-sourcing, carrying inventory and backup production to hedge against supply disruption. Most such studies are from the perspective of the buyer, and consider the ex ante decisions, such as supplier selection, order allocation, pricing and sourcing strategy. Tomlin [14] focuses on the supply-side tactics (sourcing mitigation, inventory mitigation, and contingent rerouting) when the manufacturer can source from two suppliers, one is unreliable and the other is reliable but more expensive. He finds that inventory mitigation is not an attractive strategy when the disruption occurs rarely but lasts a long time. Babich et al. [15] establish a one-period model of a supply chain with one retailer and multiple risky suppliers to study the problems of supplier selection, pricing, and ordering policies among firms. Zeng and Xia [16] discuss the interactions between the purchasing firm and the backup supplier and the backup supply contract design problem. Yang et al. [17] consider the supplier selection to either pay a penalty to the manufacturer for the shortfall or use backup 6 production to fulfill the manufacturer's order once disruption occurs. Huang and Xu [18] investigate the coexistence and exclusivity of dual sourcing and backup production. Tomlin and Snyder [19] consider a threat advisory system in which the firm, operating a periodic-review inventory system, sources from an unreliable supplier, for which inventory is the only disruption-management tactic, and then extend their model to the situation in which the firm can source from two suppliers. They characterize the optimal threat-dependent inventory levels and show that a threat advisory system can result in substantial cost savings. Sawik [20] uses VaR and CVaR to study the supplier selection and order allocation in make-to-order environment in the presence of supply chain disruption risks. Hu and Kostamis [21] investigate a manufacturer's optimal multiple-sourcing strategies, and show that the optimal unreliable orders are ranked by a simple and intuitive criterion, and are invariant of minor market size changes.
Increased attention has been paid to mutual assistance between upstream and downstream partners, such as financial assistance, price and/or quantity incentives. First, the financial problems of suppliers can lead to supply disruption; hence, manufacturers may use financial means, such as financial subsidies, to alleviate the financial state of the supplier. Babich [22] uses a dynamic, stochastic, periodic-review model to examine both the optimal joint capacity ordering and financial subsidy policy for the manufacturer, demonstrating the process by which a manufacturer can bring down its supply risk by providing financial subsidies to suppliers. Wadecki et al. [23] modify Babich's model by considering competition among manufacturers and the use of dedicated or shared suppliers among them, and by analyzing the optimal subsidy decisions of manufacturers in four supply chain structures. They also examine the impact of manufacturer-level competition on subsidies and the effect of yield uncertainty on the consumer surplus. Tang et al. [10] consider that buyers can offer either direct (investment subsidy) or indirect (inflated order quantity) incentives to their preferred supplier to improve its process reliability, and find that for the all-or-nothing model, the buyer prefers to only use the subsidy option, but in the partial disruption model, both incentives-subsidy and order inflation-may be used at the same time. Second, once supply disruption occurs, the buyer may use price and/or quantity levers to provide incentives to the supplier and facilitate restoration investment. Hu et al. [24] focus on how the buyer can use price and/or quantity incentives to motivate supplier investment in capacity restoration and restoration effort after disruption; they then compare this approach with a supplier diversification strategy.
Contract design under disruption risk also plays a prominent role in the risk management of a 7 buyer. Much of current work focuses on pricing strategies and order allocation in the multi-suppliers system. The choice between short-term and long-term contracts and dynamic contracts when the default risk of suppliers is endogenous are explored in [25] . However, few papers consider the production recovery of the supplier (restoration recovery) and the non-delivery penalty decision of the buyer in the contract. Iyer et al. [26] assume that the backorder cost of the buyers is private information, and that the cost of restoration depends on the speed with which it has been completed. They also study the upfront investment of the supplier during regular periods and optimal contract structure. Non-delivery penalty and financial assistance distinguish our research from their study. Gurani and Shi [27] , meanwhile, use a Nash bargaining game to compute the optimal contract price and quantity of trade, as well as to discuss the role of using down-payment or non-delivery penalty in the contract. However, the non-delivery penalty is not a decision variable in that work. Shou et al. [28] establish two competing supply chains, each of which consists of one retailer and one supplier. They also consider two types of contracts, namely, the revenue sharing contract and the wholesale-price contract with linear penalty for supply disruption, after which they characterize their optimal contract terms under supply uncertainty.
The above supply disruption problems belong to the field of enterprise risk management (ERM) [29] . Enterprise risk may come from a variety of factors with potential impact on business operations, especially on supply chains [30] . Based on Wu et al. [30] , Choi et al. [31] summarize the enterprise risks source: external risks, internal risks and procedural risks. For example, external risks consist of regulatory risk, market risk and partner risk, and internal risks include human resource, technological risk, financial risk etc. Supply disruption is a type of partner risk. ERM takes a systematic approach to risk management in organizations, including identification, analysis and either acceptance or mitigation of uncertainty in investment decision making [29] . Hoyt and Liebenberg [32] find a positive relation between firm value and the use of ERM. Wu et al. [33] provide a review on the use of business intelligence in the ERM. Choi et al. [31] offer an excellent review on ERM and identify pioneer work and pioneer scholars. They review and conduct critical analysis of the work of Wu and Olson [30] . The current researches mainly focus on the ERM framework ( [30] , [34] ), the benefit of ERM ( [32] ), the techniques of ERM ( [35] , [36] ) and the organizational dynamics of the ERM ( [37] ). Our work falls into ERM by focusing on how to use effective strategies to mitigate the impact of substantial enterprise risk on participators of supply chain. The study on ERM focuses on enterprise risk-mitigation management, whereas in this paper, mutual assistance between partners happens after the realization of supply 8 disruption, therefore, it is used as a contingency tactic. Furthermore, Stackelberg game has been widely used to discuss supply chain problems [38] , such as supply chain coordination (Qi et al. [39] ), supply chain disruption (Tang et al. [10] ). This paper uses Stackelberg game to cope with supply disruption problem which is an important topic in ERM. We choose part of some classical researches which focus on different operational tools to deal with supply disruption to highlight the contributions of this paper (see Table 1 ). This paper is different from the existence researches. First, unlike the paper studying supply disruption from the manufacturer's perspective, our study has a more comprehensive scope including the production recovery decision of a supplier after supply disruption, the penalty decision of the manufacturer before supply disruption, and the financial assistance provided by the manufacturer to help the capital-constrained supplier in disruption management. Second, except Hu et al. [24] , the researches on mutual assistance in the presence of supply chain disruption ignore the supplier's production recovery (restoration recovery) after supply disruption. More importantly, different from 9 mutual assistance shown in other studies, in our study, the manufacturer loans money to the supplier in order to provide incentive to the supplier or sets the penalty of non-delivery in the contract. Third, in the field of ERM, many risk management tools have been used to deal with enterprise risk. Financial assistance between supply chain enterprises, production recovery and Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the supplier distinguish our study from the existing works on ERM. Finally, we pay attention to the use of ex-post strategy to protect the firm's profit.
The Model
We consider a one-period make-to-order supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier (he) and a risk-neutral manufacturer (she). The manufacturer purchases a single product from the supplier and resells it to a market with a demand D, which follows a cumulative probability distribution In the state of no disruption, the supplier can meet the manufacturer's order and then finish the contract signed by the manufacturer and the supplier. However, the supplier's production process is subject to a disruption with probability  . When a disruption happens, the supplier exerts efforts to recover his production and may deliver fewer products than that the manufacturer has ordered.
To prevent significant profit loss from supply disruption and compel the supplier to resume production as soon as possible, the supplier will pay a penalty to the manufacturer as agreed in the contract. Once a supply disruption happens, however, the supplier may be capital-constrained, and the manufacturer may offer financial assistance to the supplier (i.e., lending money to the supplier).
The manufacturer can adopt three strategies to deal with a supply disruption: an ex-ante penalty strategy (PS) with the penalty, an ex-post financial assistance strategy (FAS) with a loan to the supplier, or a mixed strategy (MS) with a penalty and FAS. The sequence of events under different strategies is shown in Figure 1 . In PS, we consider two different decision-making scenarios, centralized and decentralized. In the centralized decision making, the objective of the centralized decision maker is to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain. In the decentralized decision making, the participants of the supply chain maximize their individual profits, respectively.
In both FAS and MS, at Stage 1, the manufacturer signs a quantity discount contract with the supplier, simultaneously determining the wholesale price 0 () wq , the order quantity 0 q , the contract period T , and the unit penalty e
. If a disruption happens, the manufacturer may then offer a loan to the supplier and set an interest rate  at Stage 3. At Stage 4, the supplier exerts production recovery effort and decides the recovery effort z . In FAS, the unit penalty is zero, which means that the 11 manufacturer does not ask the supplier to pay non-delivery penalty. The MS strategy is similar to the FAS, but differs in that both the financial assistance and the penalty are considered simultaneously in the MS.
To model the supplier's production process, we assume the supplier produces the product at the rate of 0 qT per time unit in the normal state designated for on-time delivery. Suppose that the quantity discount contract goes into effect at time 0. At time 2 tt  ( 2 0 tT ), the supplier is subject to a disruption resulting from a non-force majeure event, causing the production rate to immediately fall to 0 (e.g., the Philips semiconductor plant shut down because of a fire). At the same time, the supplier starts to recover his production. For analytical tractability, we let 2 0 t  . The recovery time is the time period when the supplier's delivery quantity equals the order quantity 0 q . Since the supplier delivers the products produced during the recovery period at the end of the contract (T ), the recovery time should be as long as possible; otherwise, the storage cost will emerge. Furthermore, given the order quantity 0 q , the recovery cost/effort decreases as the recovery time increases. The recovery time thus should be the contract time which is the maximum time for the production recovery. The supplier then uses emergency resource to recover the production, where the unit production cost e c is higher than that of normal state because of extra resources investment (i.e., es cc  ). If more resources are invested to recover the production, the production rate will be recovered more quickly, and then the supplier will deliver more products to the manufacturer within the contract period. Thus, we define es z c c  as the recovery effort that affects the recovery of the production rate, and finally determines the delivery quantity.
One practical case is that the production rate is recovered progressively over time. To model such a case, let the production rate at time t be modeled by
, which refers to the increase of the values of k, z and t. Here k is a fixed production recovery coefficient, which can be interpreted as the basic factors related to the disruption management of the supplier (e.g., flexibility, preventive measures, and the quality of the machines). To focus on the essential factors, such as penalty terms and financial assistance, we assume that the recovered production rate is a linear function of unit production cost z and t , i.e., the production rate at time t is kzt . In such case, the accumulated delivery To model the capital constraint, we assume that the supplier has some initial cash R to cover the extra expense of recovering the production, such as overtime payment, the cost of repairing damaged machines, and so on. The total cash consumed during the recovery production process is 
R c kc T 
). If after the recovery process, the remaining money at time T plus a transfer payment from the manufacturer is less than the penalty to be paid to the manufacturer for delivery shortfall, then the supplier risks financial distress and even bankruptcy. Therefore, we assume that the supplier accepts the contract only under the precondition of not going bankrupt, i.e., 0 ) 2
We list the notation in Table 2 . 
Table 2. Summary of Key Notations
D : demand () F  / () f  : distribution/
The Baseline Case without Disruption
We first study the benchmark case without disruption. In line with Cachon [41] , we assume the supply chain is coordinated with the -all unit‖ quantity-discount contract. The manufacturer's expected sale, ) (q S , is thus given by:
Combining the above two equations, we have the following result: 
sc q pS q vI q cq
According to Cachon [41] and Tomlin [42] , the supply chain can be coordinated with an -all unit‖ quantity-discount contract, and the ordering price of the manufacturer is expressed as 
Meanwhile, the profit function of the supplier can be written as
Note that other contract types, such as the buy-back contract, the revenue sharing contract, the quantity flexibility contract and the sales rebate contract, can also coordinate the supply chain and redistribute profit among players. Therefore, even if a different contract is adopted, our following analytic results are still valid.
Ex-ante PS with Supply Disruption
In PS, when the supply is disrupted, the manufacturer does nothing but asks the supplier to pay a penalty for the delivery shortfall at time T . Prior to the penalty decision, the supplier and the manufacturer agree to a quantity-discount contract specifying the price and order quantity. Then, the manufacturer determines a unit penalty e. After the disruption, the supplier determines the level of production recovery and the corresponding delivery quantity. Both the manufacturer and supplier seek to maximize their respective profits, which can be called -the decentralized decision making‖.
Production recovery decisions made by the supplier
Given the unit penalty e , the optimization problem of the supplier after a disruption, is to optimize c e and q, such that 00 max ( , ) ( 
From Eq. (1), we derive the following result. All proofs are attached in the appendix. 
e w q kT  is the optimal delivery quantity without capital constraint. We consider two cases: Case I: The above theorem shows that, as the initial capital R is sufficiently large, the supplier's delivery quantity increases with the penalty level e until q 0 is achieved. This result indicates that the penalty can effectively force the supplier to increase the recovery effort. However, when R is small, the delivery quantity becomes constant relative to the penalty term e. In other words, the penalty is not always helpful for the manufacturer to receive the contracted quantity q 0 if the supplier does not have sufficient capital. Overall, the supplier should take the capital constraint into consideration when determining the level of e, because the lack of cash can lead to the failure of the optimal delivery quantity policy. decreases, the bankruptcy risk increases. Lemma 1 shows that when the supplier is capital-constrained, the longer the time taken to meet contractual obligations, the lower the bankruptcy risk becomes. Hence, the penalty also has an effect on the bankruptcy risk level. In reality, the high penalty can urge the supplier to increase his production, reducing the negative impact of supply disruption; however, an oppressive penalty clause may lead to a greater risk faced by the supplier, especially for a capital-constrained one. Once the disruption happens, the supplier may suffer catastrophic losses, which can lead to bankruptcy, so the manufacturer must give a suitable penalty for long-term trade relationship. Thus, the study on decisions of two firms in the case of LP has more practical significance.
The penalty decision of the manufacturer
In the case of LP, the response of the supplier depends on the penalty. Consequently, the manufacturer determines e to maximize her expected profit, which is expressed as Lemma 2 shows that in the case of LP, if the supplier has more time to recover his production, then the manufacturer will set a lower unit penalty. In the case of HP, we know from Lemma 1 that the bankruptcy risk decreases due to the increase of T , so if the supplier is unable to increase the delivery quantity due to its being capital-constrained, then the manufacturer can maximize her profit by increasing the unit penalty e . The manufacturer can even make her profit bigger than that when there is no disruption, which is referred to as -opportunism behavior.‖ 
Centralized decision-making with supply disruption
In the centralized situation, the supply chain is managed by a central decision-maker whose objective is to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain.
Given the delivery quantity q , the centralized supply chain profit under a disruption is written as Lemma 4 states that the quantity of the delivered products under a disruption is less than that without disruption because the response to supply disruption changes the production cost. Therefore, the whole supply chain profit is hurt if the supplier produces and delivers as stated in the order. If the manufacturer seeks to maximize the total supply chain profit, she should initiate some measures to motivate the supplier to produce * ce q units, not the order quantity q 0 .
Theorem 4 shows that the optimal delivery quantity maximizing the profit of supply chain is * ce q .
However, in the decentralized case, how does the manufacturer set a penalty which can achieve the maximum profit for the entire supply chain? In other words, how does a penalty make Theorem 5 indicates that the manufacturer constrains the behavior of the supplier by setting the unit penalty e . However, the capital state of the supplier should be considered.
MS with Supply Disruption
Having analyzed the ex-ante PS in the decentralized and centralized situations with supply disruption, we now turn our attention to the MS. To help the supplier to deal with his capital problems, the manufacturer may offer financial assistance. This means that the manufacturer loans money to the 21 supplier at a reasonable interest rate. This solution helps the supplier effectively handle the disruption and enables the manufacturer to avoid more problems, such as searching for new suppliers, being out of stock, changing its sales planning, and so on.
In this case, the manufacturer proposes an interest rate to the supplier, who then decides whether to accept the assistance. At this point, the supplier also decides on how many products to be produced.
Upon the acceptance of assistance, the unit product cost c e is financed by two streams of cash, c e =c 0 +c 1 , where c 0 comes from the supplier's own capital in unit production cost, and c 1 comes from the debt, which has a total of B=c 1 q. Let  ( 01   ) be the interest rate. Then the total interest paid to the manufacturer is  q c 1 .
From previous discussion, we know that the relationship between c e and q is given by 
From Theorem 1, we know that when , the supplier has enough cash to achieve the optimal delivery quantity. In this case, financial assistance is not necessary.
Our following focus is to identify when the manufacturer offers the financial assistance and how this affects the production of the supplier when From Theorem 6, in the case that the supplier accepts the financial assistance, the optimal delivery quantity increases as e , T , 0 c or k increase; however, it decreases as 0 q increases. Thus, the more cash the supplier has, the higher the delivery quantity becomes Considering the production decision of the supplier, the expected profit function of the manufacturer is given by 
Theorem 6. 1) If
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Lemma 6. As the market price p increases (decreases) during the disruption, the optimal interest rate
*  decreases (increases) correspondingly. 23 We know from Lemmas 5 and 6 that, if the market price rises in the process of dealing with the disruption, the manufacturer can motivate the supplier to deliver more products by decreasing the interest rate. The cause lies in the fact that the expected loss of shortage increases when the profit margin increases. Thus, it is more important to meet the market demand. On the contrary, if the market price falls, the manufacturer increases the interest rate to motivate the supplier to decrease the delivery quantity. Thus, the MS can help the manufacturer control the output of the supplier while avoiding the risk of volatile prices.
The results in Theorems 6 and 7 can be applied to the ex-post FAS by letting the penalty e being equal to zero. Furthermore, the results in Lemmas 5 and 6 can also be applied to the ex-post FAS given 0 e  .
The Strategy Preference of the Manufacturer
We now explore the process by which the parameters in the model may influence what kind of disruption management strategies is chose by the manufacturer. This is also discussed from the supplier's perspective. When a supply disruption occurs, there are three strategies which can be chose from: the PS, the FAS, and the MS. Let =0 e , the optimal decisions in FAS can be given by Theorems 6 and 7. We investigate the effect of a number of key attributes on the preferred strategy. Such attributes include the initial cash of the supplier (as measured by the supplier's own capital in unit production cost 0 c ), the market price, the demand fluctuation (as measured by the variance of demand  ), the production recovery coefficient, and the coefficient of profit allocation.
Theorems 1 and 6 show that the manufacturer cannot do anything but use the penalty strategy, if
. This is because in that situation, the supplier is not capital-constrained and the strategic choice problems do not exist. Thus, we only discuss the case The numerical results are summarized in Figure 4 , which shows how the initial cash of the supplier influences the performance ratio and the delivery ratio. Figure 4 (a) indicates that except for the manufacturer, the FAS dominants PS. It is reasonable because the manufacturer can get more benefits from the penalty than from the interest income and the increase of delivery quantity. For the supplier, both the penalty and the FAS compel him to increase the delivery quantity, but the profit of the supplier is hurt more by the penalty in PS than by the interest payment in FAS, especially when the manufacturer treats the penalty as a kind of income. Therefore, the supplier prefers a financial assistance. The profit of the whole supply chain is better off under the FAS strategy because the delivery quantity in FAS is larger than that in PS. Thus, from the supply chain's perspective, the FAS is preferred.
As Figure 4 (b) illustrates, the MS is better than the PS. The MS helps increase the delivery quantity and allows the manufacturer to obtain the interest and penalty income. For the supplier, the financial assistance deals with his capital constraint problem, and then he can produce and deliver more products to the manufacturer, finally gets more revenue and pays less penalty. Figure 4(c) shows that the manufacturer prefers the MS to the FAS, but the supplier has a contrary preference. When there is no capital constraint for the use of financial assistance, the penalty is the only method that can compel the supplier to increase the delivery quantity. Thus, the MS is the preferred strategy in this case. However, for the supplier, the penalty always hurts his profit, so the FAS is better than the MS for the supplier.
From the above analysis, we find that the MS is always the best strategy for the manufacturer. This means that if a supply disruption occurs, the best option for the manufacturer is to offer financial assistance to the capital-constrained supplier, and ask the supplier to pay for the penalty at the end of the contract period. Meanwhile, the FAS is the worst strategy for the manufacturer. Furthermore, the decision objective of the manufacturer has no impact on the strategy preference. However, the supplier has a totally different choice. The FAS is the best strategy, while the PS is the worst strategy. Thus, there is no win-win situation to both the manufacturer and the supplier.
In order to investigate the robust effect on a number of key attributes of the preferred strategy of the manufacturer, we randomly generate 1000 test problem instances from uniform distribution on the given intervals. Table 3 shows the distributions for the data set. The parameters that are not in Table 3 stay the same as before. Table 4 shows that for the supply chain and the supplier, the FAS is better than the PS for 99.8%
and 100% of the instances, respectively. Table 4 Above results indicate that the strategy preference is robust. This means that for the manufacturer, the MS is adopted as the best strategy in most situations. However, for the supplier, the FAS dominates other strategies in most of situations, and the PS is the worst strategy. The robust characteristic is important for disruption management. This is because the lack of information brought about by the low disruption frequency can increase the complexity of the decisions that must be made as well as reduce the efficiency of such decisions.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we investigate the impact of T and p on the decisions and profits of both firms.
We consider two cases: the one when there is no capital constraint and the other when there is a capital constraint.
Figures 5 and 6 imply that a long-term contract is better than a short-term one for the supplier, because he has enough time to deal with the disruption as a result of small shortage and is bond to pay small amounts of penalties and interest. Furthermore, the differences in the decisions and profits
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between the centralized and decentralized situations become small as T or p increases (see Figure   5 ).
Impact of T and p without capital constraint
The model analysis indicates that the PS is the best strategy for the manufacturer when the supplier is not capital-constrained. All parameters stay the same as those first set in Section 7. the supplier can deliver more products to the manufacturer. The manufacturer tries to get more profit from the increase of the price by giving a lower interest rate to increase the delivery quantity.
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Meanwhile, Figure 6 (c) implies that the profit of the manufacturer decreases as T increases, while the profit of the supplier increases. However, the profit of the whole supply chain is steady. On the contrary, Figure 6 (d) shows that all the profits of the manufacturer, the supplier and the supply chain increase as p increases. We can know that a good situation of the supplier will hurt the profit of the manufacturer. Furthermore, the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain fluctuate significantly. This indicates that the market price fluctuation has great impact on the manufacturer, because the price directly determines the amount of her profit.
Conclusions
This paper investigates three different strategies for the manufacturer who faces a supply disruption: the ex-ante PS (offering a contract with non-delivery penalty clause to the supplier before the disruption), the ex-post FAS (providing the supplier with financial assistance after the disruption), and the MS (penalty with financial assistance). We find that in most situations MS is the best strategy for the manufacturer, but it is not a win-win strategy because the use of penalty always hurts the supplier's profit. In contrast, the ex-post FAS is the supplier's best strategy. The PS is an ex-ante strategy and has no impact on the delivery quantity when the supplier lacks capital; however, the MS has an impact on the profits of both firms. We also find that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the optimal delivery quantity for the supply chain under the centralized decision-making is less than that under the decentralized decision-making. However, the disparity between the centralized and decentralized situations becomes less significant as T or p increases. Furthermore, we find that the supplier prefers a long-term contract to a short one because he has more time to deal with the disruption so as to reduce the shortage risk. The financial assistance not only helps the capital-constrained supplier resume his production, but also benefits the manufacturer because of better delivery and the interest income.
Note that the penalties studied in this paper are also known as -liquidated damages.‖ Liquidated damages are those specified in the contract itself. They serve as an incentive not to break the contract.
However, they do not have to be directly related to the actual loss caused by breaking the contract. Thus, if the penalties the manufacturer charges are above what the law allows, the manufacturer just chooses a lower penalty.
This study focuses on the strategies of dealing with supply disruption and provides a guideline for 31 managers dealing with unexpected supply disruption. For instance, the managers who are in charge of sourcing from the unreliable supplier may, whenever possible, sign a contract which includes penalty terms and offers financial assistance after the occurrence of a supply disruption. Our work also helps managers understand the impact of different supply chain parameters on such a strategy. In practice, however, disruption management may be more complex than any theoretical setting. There are a few ways to extend our study. First, we consider a supply chain with only one supplier and one manufacturer, but in practice, a manufacturer might have multiple suppliers. In this case, if one of these suppliers is subject to a disruption, others can deliver more products to the manufacturer. Nevertheless, the manufacturer might not know the exact number of suppliers that would be disrupted. In other words, the uncertainty of multiple suppliers can be one possible extension of this study. Second, similar to the extant papers on supply disruption, we assume that the order placed with the supplier will be delivered on time if there is no disruption. In practice, however, the supplier may face yield uncertainty due to some factors, such as imperfect production processes, quality problem, material imperfections, and capacity limitations. The second possible extension thus is to explore the disruption problems associated with yield uncertainty (e.g., [45] ). Third, the asymmetric information problem is another possible extension of this study. For instance, in our paper, the impact of disruption on the production is the supplier's private information. The supplier may exaggerate the difficulty of the production recovery in order to get more financial assistance. () 
